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Summary  findings
As countries have deregulated prices and lowered entry  Competition and open entry are crucial for these two
barriers in the natural gas industry, many new  markets to function efficien)tly.  The transportation
participants have emerged, promoting competition in the  market is affected by the market power of pipeline
newly created markets. The increased competition has  companies, but resale of transportation  contracts brings
benefited everyone through more efficient pricing and  competition to this market and facilitates the efficient
greater choice among natural gas contracts,  allocation of contracts. Intermediaries and spot markets
Four distinct structural models have emerged in the  promote efficient pricing and minimize transactions
industry's restructuring. The traditional  model (a  costs.
vertically integrated industry) has been increasingly  Markets have become more conmplex  with
replaced by models that decentralize the industry along  deregulation, and trading mechanisms are n-eeded  ro
horizontal and vertical lines.  ensare the simultaneous clearing of natural gas and
With increasing decentralization, regulation of the  transportation  markets at minimum cost to the industry.
industry focuses on pipeline transportation  and  Two main trading models guide transactions: the
distribution, the industry segments with natural  bilateral trading model (which relies on decentralized
monopoly characteristics. Regulation aims to protect  bilateral negotiations between market participants) and
both end users and participants in the deregulated  the poolco model (which relies on a centralized entity to
segments from the market power of companies operating  coordinate transactions).
in the monopolistic segments.  Properly applied, both models lead to the same
As a result of deregulation, two major markets emerge:  outcome. The bilateral trading model has dotninated
the natural gas market (which facilitates the trading of  because of its simplicity of implementation,  but the
natural gas as a commodity) and the transportation  poolco m.odel  has great potential once problems of
market (which enables market participants to trade the  sharing and processing information are addressed.
services needed to ship natural gas through  pipelines).
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The deregulation and restructuring of the natural gas industry in many industrial and developing
countries have led to the development of new markets  that have altered the way the industry
operates. As countries have deregulated prices and lowered entry barriers in the industry, many
new  participants  have  emerged,  promoting  competition  in  the  newly  created markets.  The
increased competition has benefited all participants in the natural gas industry-through  more
efficient pricing and greater choice of natural gas contracts.
Four distinct structural models have emerged in the restructuring of the natural gas industry, with
the  traditional model of a vertically  integrated industry increasingly replaced by models that
decentralize the industry  along horizontal and  vertical lines. These  models introduce greater
competition and new models of interaction among market participants, and they reflect how far a
country has advanced in its reform of the natural gas industry. With increasing decentralization,
regulation  of  the  industry  focuses on  pipeline  transportation  and  distribution,  the  industry
segments with natural monopoly characteristics. The objective of regulation is to protect both the
end users and the participants in the deregulated segments from the market power of companies
operating in the monopolistic segments.
Two major markets emerge as a result of deregulation: the natural gas market, which facilitates
the trading of natural gas as a commodity, and the transportation market, which enables market
participants to trade the transportation services necessary to ship natural gas through the pipeline
system. Competition and open entry are crucial for the efficient functioning of these two markets.
Although the transportation market is affected by the market power of pipeline companies, resale
of  transportation contracts introduces  competition in  this  market  and  facilitates the  efficient
allocation of contracts. Intermediaries and spot markets promote efficient pricing and minimize
transaction costs.
With  increasing deregulation,  markets  become  more  complex,  and  trading  mechanisms  are
needed to ensure simultaneous clearing of natural gas and transportation markets at the minimum
cost  to  the industry.  Two  main  trading  models  achieve  this  socially  optimal  outcome: the
bilateral  trading model,  which  relies  on  decentralized  bilateral negotiations  between market
participants to reach this outcome, and the poolco model, which relies on a centralized entity that
coordinates individual transactions.
If properly applied, both models lead to the same outcome. The bilateral trading model has been
the  dominant  model  used  in  the  gas  industry,  however,  because  of  its  simplicity  in
implementation.  But  the  poolco model  has  great potential  once  problems  with  sharing  and
processing information are adequately addressed.
This paper outlines the main characteristics of the deregulated natural gas industry. It provides an
overview of the main determinants and models of industry structure and the basic principles of
economic regulation in the natural gas industry. It describes markets that  have emerged as a
result of deregulation and looks at new markets in storage, metering, pipeline construction, and
system balancing. Finally, it outlines the mechanics of bilateral trading and  "poolco"  models,
which guide transactions in the natural gas industry. Two companion papers give case studies of4
natural gas deregulation  in the United  Kingdom  and the United  States (Juris forthcoming  a and
b).5
Opening the Gas Industry to Competition
Many countries have undertaken substantial structural and regulatory changes in their natural gas
industries in recent years opening natural gas and pipeline transportation markets to competition.
Since  1984  the  United  States  has  separated  natural  gas  supply  from  interstate  pipeline
transportation,  deregulated  natural gas production  and  the  wholesale market,  and  introduced
competition  in interstate pipeline transportation. Another major reformer, the United Kingdom,
partially opened its natural gas market to competition in 1986. when the government privatized
British Gas.
The United Kingdom continued deregulation by further opening the wholesale natural gas market
and promoting  the natural gas resale. The most recent measures are aimed at fully separating
pipeline transportation from supply and gradually introducing competition in the retail market.
By  1998 the United Kingdom  should have the most competitive  natural gas  industry  in  the
world.
Other countries have followed the lead of these two reforners.  Argentina undertook a radical
reform of its gas industry in 1992, when it separated and then privatized natural gas production,
transportation, and distribution. Distribution companies and large end users can now purchase
natural  gas  directly  from  producers,  bypassing  the  resale  units  of  pipeline  transportation
companies. Mexico opened its natural gas market to competition in 1993, and Hungary separated
and privatized distribution companies in 1994-95.
Many other countries in Asia, Europe, and Latin America too would like to reform their natural
gas industries to improve efficiency and attract new investment. These countries stand to benefit
a great deal from the lessons learned by reform countries.
A government that wants to reform the natural gas industry faces a complex task.  It needs to
assess the viability of competition in the industry as a  whole and in its  segments, identifying
those  with  natural  monopoly  characteristics. And  it  needs  to  formulate  optimal  regulatory
policies  and  introduce  mechanisms  to  support  efficient  interactions  between  regulated  and
deregulated segments of the industry.
Determinants of industry structure
The  viability  of  competition  in  the  natural  gas  industry  is  determined  by  three  factors:
technology, the size of the market, and entry barriers. Technology determines economies of scale
and scope and thus a firm's optimal (or minimum efficient) size. The size of a market determines
how many firms can efficiently compete in it. Entry barriers determine whether an additional
firm can enter  the market,  if the opportunity to  do so exists.  These three  underlying  factors
determine the efficient configuration of the industry in a static model.
A dynamic model of the natural gas industry incorporates changes in the underlving factors to
reflect the dynamics of the environment in which the industry participants operate. Technological
development,  uncertainty  about  supply  and  demand,  and  regulatory  changes  influence  the6
viability of competition  in the industry in the long run. The viability of competition must  be
assessed  separately  for  each  segment  of  the  natural  gas  industry,  because  participants  use
different technologies in each segment.
The natural gas industry consists of the following segments: production, pipeline transportation,
trading and supply, and distribution. In the reforn  countries production and trading and supply
are potentially competitive,  while transportation and distribution  are characterized by natural
monopolv.
Natural gas production consists of the large set of operations necessary to deliver natural gas to
the  wellhead,  such  as  exploration,  drilling,  production,  and  gathering.  Gathering  is  the
aggregation of natural gas produced by individual wellheads and its delivery to a  location such
as a terminal, where it is injected into a pipeline. It is usually considered part of the production,
because producers often own and operate  gathering pipelines.  Production is characterized by
multiproduct scale economies across the whole set of operations at the firm level, but these scale
economies  typically  are  not  large  enough  to  eliminate  competition  at  the  industry  level.
Producers must incur substantial fixed start-up costs, mich  of it sunk, first in the acquisition of
drilling rights and technology and then in exploration and drilling.  Only then can a producer
start producing natural gas. It is more feasible for one firm to  carryout both  exploration and
drilling than to separate these tasks because of the uncertainty in searching for natural gas. As a
result, the optimal size of a production firm is large, though still small relative to the natural gas
market. There are more than 100 natural gas producers in the United States, and more than 40 in
the United Kingdom.
Natural gas trading refers to the resale of natural gas in the wholesale market,  and supply to
resale in the retail market.  (In the United States gas trading  and  independent gas supply  are
considered part of marketing.) Because these two operations are closely related, they are often
performed by the same firm. The gas trading and supply business is a very competitive segment
because of the limited scale economies. Traders and suppliers need little up-front investment to
start operations-a  trader needs only a desk, a computer, and a telephone to contact customers
and make deals. As a result, the optimal size of a gas trader or supplier is small relative to the gas
market. This optimal size increases with deregulation of the industry-because  markets become
more complex, with increasing use of short-term and financial transactions-but  not enough to
pose a threat to competition in the segment.
Natural gas  transportation  is the set  of operations to  deliver  natural  gas from  a  producer to
consumer markets through high-pressure pipelines. The transportation segment is characterized
by natural monopoly because of the large multiproduct economies  of scale resulting  from the
high fixed costs of pipeline construction. Most of the fixed costs are sunk because a pipeline has
limited alternative uses. Operating costs are relatively low, because it costs little to move natural
gas  through  pipelines.  There  are  also  economies  of  scale  associated  with  the  multiproduct
characteristics of transportation services. A pipeline company can use the same pipeline system
to offer transportation services that differ in time, location, and other dimensions (such as the
calorific value of natural gas and the intake and offtake pressure of the pipeline). As a result, only7
one pipeline company can typically operate in the transportation segment, although large markets
can accommodate several pipeline companies.
Natural gas distribution consists of the operations necessary to deliver  natural gas to the end
users,  including  low-pressure  pipeline  transportation,  supply  of  natural  gas,  metering,  and
construction  of customer sites.  Distribution  is characterized by  natural monopoly  because of
economies of  scale  in  transportation operations. Additionally, there  are  economies  of  scope
among various operations of a distribution company, because they are performed by the same
distribution pipeline system. It is still unclear whether the economies of scope are large enough
to prevent efficient unbundling of transportation and supply operations at the distribution level.
But open access to distribution does seem  to generate sufficient competition in supply to large
end users.'  Distribution companies  typically enjoy exclusivity  in natural  gas  supply  in  their
region, but an increasing number of countries have instituted open access in distribution.
Regulate or not?
Natural monopoly in pipeline transportation and distribution calls  for economic  regulation to
prevent the  incumbent utility from  exercising its market  power. The  main goal of economic
regulation is to promote economic efficiency. Regulators often pursue additional goals, such as
fairness or transparency, but these should complement rather than substitute for the economic
efficiency goal. Economic  regulation employs various  mechanisms  to  regulate  the prices of
goods and services, the performance of regulated firms, and market entry.2
Two well-known and widely used regulatory mechanisms are rate-of-return regulation and price
caps. Rate-of return regulation allows the regulated utility to set rates for natural gas such that it
earns no more than a predetermined rate of return on its capital. The regulator approves the rates
and the size of the capital base that is used for calculating rate of return, and prohibits entry in the
utility's  line of business. The targeted rate of return is typically set equal to the rate of return on
capital facing the same risk as the utility's  capital. The utility is assured of earning the targeted
rate of return because the regulator typically allows a pass-through of cost increases to the end
user rates.)
I Introduction  of open access in distribution  had positive  results  in Argentina,  the United  Kingdom,  and the United
States, where end users benefited  from lower prices and greater  choice. But pilot programs in retail competition
showed  that a local  distribution  utility can exercise  market  power  through  its control of system  operation,  metering,
or billing. So the benefits  of unbundling  distribution  must be weighed against the costs of potential  exercise of
market  power  and of regulation  of distribution.
2 There is a whole  body of literature  on the theory  of optimal  regulation  and  pricing.  See Berg  and Tschirhart 1988,
Braeutigam  1989,  or Laffont  and Tirole 1993.
3 The actual  rate of return  earned  by a utility does  not always  reach  the predetermined  level because  of regulatory
lag, the time between  the cost increase  and the regulatory  decision  that  approves  cost pass-through.  In such a case
the regulator  asks  the utility  to adjust its rates so as to recover  the difference  between  the actual  and targeted  rates of
return in the subsequent  period.  A utility regulated  by rate-of-return  regulation  seldom  achieves  the targeted  rate of
return  in very dynamic  markets.8
Price cap regulation sets the maximum price that a natural gas utility can charge its customers for
a certain period. After this time, typically three to five years, the regulator reviews the welfare
impact of the price cap and determines a new price cap. The utility cannot increase its revenues
by charging more than the price cap, but it is free to minimize its costs. Since cost cutting could
occur at the expense of safety and reliability, the regulator sets well-defined safety and reliability
standards for the utility. So the  incentive for the utility is to operate efficiently. 4 All changes in
input costs are absorbed by the utility until the price cap review, unless the regulator allows a
pass-through of some costs (for exarnple, fuel costs).
The  economic  efficiency  goal  of  regulation  implies  that  the  regulated  prices  of  pipeline
transportation  or distribution services must  reflect their  economic costs  and  maximize  social
welfare. This does not necessarily mean that regulators must always set prices administratively.
Instead, whenever possible, regulators should adopt pricing concepts that give a utility incentives
to set  optimal prices for transportation and distribution  services. Such concepts as  peak-load
pricing, Ramsey pricing, and nonlinear pricing  promote efficient pricing and benefit all industry
participants.
If competition is viable in natural gas production and trade and supply, prices and entry should
be deregulated to promote efficient markets. If producers, traders, and suppliers are restricted in
their ability to set prices or enter the market, some participants will acquire enough market power
to sustain high prices. Without price arbitrage or entry to discipline incumbent companies, other
market participants incur welfare losses.
Small countries often have limited competition in their natural gas markets, because the markets
are not large enough to support efficient operation by a large number of domestic producers or
suppliers.  In these countries regulators should focus on lowering entry barriers rather than on
regulating domestic firms. If entry barriers are low, the threat of entry by foreign competitors can
serve as an effective check on domestic market participants.
Structural  models of the natural  gas industry
The more than 10 years of deregulation have produced new structural models of the natural gas
industry. Traditional vertical integration is being replaced by de-integration along both vertical
and horizontal lines. The most important structural changes in the gas industry are open access
- opening the pipeline transportation segment to third-party transportation - and unbundling
- separating natural gas supply from pipeline transportation. These changes have led to  four
distinct structural models of the natural gas industry.
Vertical integration
4 Formulation  of the  price  cap  is  very  important  in  determining  the  efficiency  of incentives  faced  by  the  utility.  For
example,  a price  cap  equal  to the  weighted  average  price  of all services  offered  by  the utility  can  harm  the  utility  or
its customers  if consumption  of services  varies  a lot.  It also  neglects  the issue  of  how  new  services  should  be
regulated.  Setting  price  caps  for individual  services  equal  to their  stand-alone  costs  gives  the  utility  more  efficient
incentives  than  a price  cap  based  on a weighted  average  price.9
Model  1 is  the traditional  structure of  the  natural  gas  industry,  where  production,  pipeline
transportation,  and  distribution  are all  performed by  one  company, an  integrated gas  utility
(figure 1). Typically, such a utility has an exclusive position in natural gas supply to end users,
that  is,  in  the retail market.  An example is  Gazprom,  the Russian  gas company,  which  is
engaged in all segments of the industry.
An integrated gas utility is usually heavily regulated because of its monopoly position  in the
retail market.  The regulatory  agency  typically  uses rate-of-return or  price  cap regulation  to
promote economic efficiency and restrict the utility's market power.
A vertically integrated utility lacks the flexibility required in a dynamic market environment, and
regulation  is  often  insufficient  to  induce  it  to  operate  efficiently.  Governments  seeking
alternative  industry configurations that would  address these problems have identified  several
areas  with  good  potential  for  cost  savings:  production,  wholesale  transactions,  and  retail
transactions.
Competition in natural gas production
Model 2 separates production from the rest of the industry and introduces competition among
producers,  resulting in  more efficient production  than in model  1 (figure 2).  Producers sell
natural gas to a gas utility, which then resells it to the end users. The transactions between the
producers  and the utility  lead to  the development  of a  wholesale natural  gas  market,  where
natural gas is traded for further resale. A typical example of a model 2 gas utility is British Gas
prior to  its privatization in  1986; before it was privatized, it purchased natural gas from more
than 40 producers.
In model 2 regulation is needed to restrict the market power of the gas utility relative to both the
end users and the producers. End user prices are regulated in the same way as inl  model  1. The
price of gas sold by producers to the utility is also regulated. But the optimal way to determine a
purchase price is through competitive bidding,  in which  producers bid by price  for a supply
contract with the gas utility. A price determined through competition reflects the market value of
natural gas far better than does a price set by a regulator.
Monopolistic gas utilities can often prevent the pass-through of cost savings in production to end
users  because  of  distortive  regulation or  an  ability  to  exercise  market  power.  Governments
therefore seek ways to open pipeline transportation and distribution to competition.
Open access and wholesale competition
Model 3 introduces open access in pipeline transportation, opening the segment to  third-party
transportation (figure 3). In this model a gas utility thus provides two kinds of service: supplying
natural  gas  to  end  users and  supplying  transportation  services to  large end  users and  other
eligible industry participants that  purchase natural gas independently in the wholesale market.
Alternatively, a gas utility is separated vertically into a pipeline company and several distribution10
utilities, and they provide open access to their pipeline networks. 5 The gas industry in the United
States between 1985 and 1992 was a typical example of the model 3 gas industry, as was the
U.K. gas industry before British Gas was unbundled into a gas supplier and a pipeline operator in
1996.
The open access regime promotes efficiency in the wholesale gas market and benefits market
participants. Producers benefit because open access dramatically increases the number of buyers,
eliminating  the monopsony  problem  in model  2. Downstream  industry  participants.  such  as
distribution utilities or large end users, benefit from direct access to the production segment and a
greater choice in gas supply.
But pipeline companies are in a more difficult position than in models 1 and 2 because they have
to  coordinate  transportation  of  their  own  and  third-party  natural  gas  through  the  pipeline
network. This coordination can be achieved by  introducing market  mechanisms  that optimize
interactions among market participants and the operation of the pipeline system in deregulated
natural gas markets. Such coordination can be facilitated by the trading mechanism described in
the section below on trading models.
Transactions in the wholesale natural gas market are typically conducted on a bilateral basis, but
increasing complexity calls for intermediation of these transactions. The acquisition of natural
gas and transportation services is often complex, and for some market participants it may be too
difficult and costly. High transaction costs discourage smaller market participants from utilizing
open  access, despite  opportunities  for cost  saving. This  creates room  for natural  gas traders,
which aggregate demand and supply for a number of smaller market participants by purchasing
natural gas and transportation  services on their behalf. Traders charge fees for intermediating
transactions and minimize the costs of natural gas and transportation services by buying large
quantities  and  arbitraging  across  available  prices.  Competition  among  traders  is  crucial  to
minimize their fees and to maximize the benefits for their clients.
There are three important regulatory tasks in the model 3 gas industry: to protect end users from
the monopoly power of gas utilities, to promote competition in the wholesale gas market, and to
restrict the market power of pipeline companies relative to the users of their pipeline networks.
End user prices are regulated, using rate-of-return or price gap regulation. Wholesale gas prices
are  deregulated  if  there  is  sufficient  competition  in  the  market.  If  competition  is  limited,
regulators  should focus  on removing entry barriers rather than  on directly  regulating prices,
because regulating wholesale prices does not promote the development of competitive trading.
The price of a transportation service, or the access price, is one of the most important factors in
achieving competition and efficiency in the wholesale market. The reason is that unregulated
5 There  are many variations  on the open  access  regime,  depending  on the pressure  level  at which  pipelines  are
subject  to open access.  Determining  the threshold  level is important  in ensuring  optimal  investment  in the gas
industry.  If the threshold  is too high, many large  end users  find it cost-effective  to bypass  low-pressure,  non-open-
access  pipelines  by constructing  a connection  to a pipeline  that  makes  them eligible  for open access.  This  may result
in overinvestment  in pipelines.11
pipeline  companies can charge excessive  access prices or  foreclose  access to  maintain  their
monopsony  power.  One  way  to  determine an  optimal access price  is  through  the  efficient
component pricing rule, which says that the access price must recover the pipeline's  costs of
providing transportation services to a third party and the pipeline's  profits forgone in gas supply
operations  lost  to  competition.  This  price  gives  a  pipeline  company  the  right  incentives to
provide open access, while it ensures that only those users that paid less for wholesale natural gas
than the pipeline company will consume transportation services.
Unbundling and retail competition
Model  4  introduces  unbundling-the  separation  of  natural  gas  supply  from  pipeline
transportation and distribution-and  full deregulation of natural gas markets (figure 4). The main
motivation for unbundling is  an  ability by pipeline companies to  restrict  competition  in the
wholesale gas market through  nonprice measures, such as offering  low-quality transportation
services.
Unbundling eliminates this distortion and creates a level playing field for all participants in the
natural  gas  market.  In  addition,  it  facilitates the development  of  a  large number  of  supply
companies that purchase natural gas in the wholesale market, resell it downstream, and use the
transportation  services  of  pipeline  and  distribution  companies.  Competition  among  supply
companies pushes down their resale markups and thus facilitates the pass-through of cost savings
from the production segment to the end users.
Increasing competition in and deregulation of the natural gas market eliminate the need for price
regulation at the wholesale level and call for regulatory mechanisms that give gas companies
more  pricing  flexibility  at the  retail level.  Rate-of-return regulation  greatly  restricts  pricing
flexibility and so is less optimal for model 4 than price cap regulation.
In model  4 the natural gas market  undergoes  significant transformnation  to  accommodate the
variable requirements of market participants, which seek more flexible trading and contractual
arrangements than in model 3. Natural gas is increasingly traded through short term contracts to
balance supply and demand  in the short-term and give market participants the flexibility they
need.
The development of a short-term, or spot, market promotes efficiency in the entire gas market.
As a spot market becomes more liquid, the spot price moves toward the short-run marginal cost
of gas, which reflects the market value of natural gas at the location of the spot market. Because
prices are continuously determined in a liquid, competitive market, the pricing of natural gas
becomes more efficient. Market participants use spot prices as a reference price in bilateral gas
supply contracts, and so as a result, most natural gas is traded at spot prices.
Short-term gas trading generates  volatility in volume and price, increasing  the uncertainty of
demand for transportation services. In some periods demand can exceed available  capacity; in
others, it may fall below constructed capacity. Pipeline companies respond by selling both firm
contracts,  which  allow  market  participants  to  purchase  transportation  services  with  high12
reliability, and interruptible contracts,  under which market participants purchase services with
low  reliability. Pipelines  also  use  gas  flow  management techniques  to  minimize  swings  in
demand and maximize gas flows through the system.
Unbundling introduces a need for simultaneous clearing of natural gas and transportation
markets. Market participants acquire natural gas based on the availability of transportation, and
vice versa. A mismatch wastes resources, because some participants are left with excess natural
gas or with reserved pipeline capacity that goes unused. A match can be achieved only when
market participants have available the same volumes of gas supply and transportation contracts.
This requires the creation of a short-term transportation market, where pipeline companies and
transportation contract holders offer available capacity for sale. An alternative is to adopt a
"poolco" trading mechanism that ensures  simultaneous clearing of natural gas and transportation
markets (see the section below on the poolco model).
Large  variability  in  contracts  increases  the  complexity  of  pricing  transportation  services.
Although pipeline companies mostly maintain their market power, they need pricing flexibility to
react  to  changing  market  conditions. Regulators  should  therefore  use price  caps  or  another
regulatory  mechanism  that gives  pipelines  pricing  flexibility while  also  promoting  efficient
relative prices.
No gas industry has developed to a full-scale model 4 structure. The United Kingdom  should
reach a model 4 structure in 1998 when it introduces full retail competition, however, and the
U.S. natural gas industry is moving in this  direction. Both countries have unbundled pipeline
transportation  and  introduced open  access  in  distribution-a  typical configuration  for  a  gas
industry in transition from model 3 to model 4 (figure 5).6 Open access in distribution is limited
to end users with consumption of a certain size (2,500 therms a year in the United Kingdom),
because the high  costs of metering make competition  nonviable in residential  gas supply.  In
addition, an incumbent distribution company can discourage use of open access by offering low-
quality or imprecise metering services to independent suppliers.
6 The United  Kingdom  and the United  States  also introduced  retail  competition  on a small  scale in some regions.  For
example,  a pilot program  gave 500,000  residential  customers  in the southeast  of England  an option to choose  their
natural  gas supplier  in 1996.  Similar  pilot programs  were introduced  in Pittsburgh,  New Hampshire,  and many other
locations  throughout  the United  States.13
The Emergence of Markets
A vertically  integrated gas industry has only one market, where natural gas and  transportation
services are sold at the consumption site as a single product, or "bundle." Open access and the
unbundling of pipeline transportation have led to the creation of two main markets, where natural
gas and transportation are traded separately.
Natural  gas  and  transportation markets  are  divided  into  several  submarkets.  based  on  the
characteristics of traded products. Product characteristics are determined by the dimensions of
the contracts  for natural  gas supply and transportation, such as  time of service. reliability  of
service, delivery location, type of financial settlement, and quantity and quality of natural gas.
The variability in the contracts has led to the development of such submarkets as long-term and
short-term markets and physical and financial gas markets.
The variability of contracts benefits industry participants because they can enter into contracts
that best suit their needs. Each participant can form a contract portfolio that minimizes their costs
and risks and maximizes their benefits. It is important that a participant's choice not be distorted
by  regulation,  which  results  in suboptimal  contracting  and  imposes  unnecessary  transaction
costs.  Where competition  has eliminated concerns about market power, regulators should put
great effort into promoting decentralized contracting among market participants.
The opening of wholesale and retail markets to competition has initiated a search for "markets"
in  all  segments  of the  natural gas  industry. Some  countries have  introduced  competition  in
storage, metering and  installation of meters, construction  of pipelines and customer  sites,  and
pipeline system balancing.
Natural gas market
In natural gas market natural gas is traded as a commodity, separate from transportation services,
in  the  form  of  gas contracts.  Although these  contracts  have multiple  dimensions,  they are
differentiated primarily by the purpose of the transaction, whether for physical delivery of gas or
for  management  of  price  risk.  The  use  of  contracts  thus  divides  the  gas  market  into  two
submarkets-physical  and financial.
Physical gas market
In the physical gas market natural gas is traded  under contracts for physical delivery  of gas,
physical gas contracts (sometimes referred to as cash gas contracts). Market participants include
producers.  traders,  suppliers, pipeline companies,  and distribution  utilities,  depending  on the
structural  model of the gas industry. The physical gas market exists  in all structural  models,
although  natural  gas  is bundled with transportation  in  models  1 and 2.  Two  dimensions  of
physical gas contracts divide the physical gas market into several submarkets: the purpose of the
transaction and the duration of the contract.14
Wholestale  and retail gas markets. Purchases of natural gas for further resale take place in the
wholesale gas market. Purchases of natural gas for end use take place in the retail gas market.
Wholesale transactions are all those concluded among producers, traders, suppliers, and pipeline
and distribution companies; retail transactions are those between suppliers and end users.
The structure of wholesale and retail markets is important for the efficiency of pricing in them.
Strong competition in these markets increases the economic efficiency of decentralized pricing
and  reduces the need  for price regulation, while a  lack of competition  raises concerns about
market power and price efficiency and calls for price regulation.
Each structural model  of the gas industry has a  different structure in its wholesale and retail
markets and thus a different potential for the optimal pricing of natural gas (figures 6 and  7).
Model I has a nonexistent wholesale market because all natural gas transactions are conducted
internally by a  single vertically  integrated company that  also  monopolizes the  retail market.
Model 2 has limited competition in both the wholesale and the retail markets. Prices of natural
gas in models 1 and 2 are regulated to prevent excessive pricing by the dominant gas utilities.
Models 3  and 4  have relatively  competitive natural  gas  markets,  and  model  4  has  a  more
competitive transportation market than model 3.
Long-term gas contracts and development of a spot market. Gas contracts can be divided based
on their duration:
- Short term-for  supply of up to one calendar month.
D  Medium term-for  I to 12 months of gas supply.
- Long term-for  more than one year.
Longer contracts become increasingly variable, because they reflect the specific requirements of
each gas supply deal. Comparisons of long-term gas contracts are therefore complicated, because
they must take into account so many dimensions.
Long-term supply contracts are the traditional way of acquiring gas. Utilities and their customers
agree on prices and on the total volume of gas to be supplied over the life of the contract and then
specify volumes for each year, quarter, or month. Long-term contracts reduce supply and price
risks, but they provide little flexibility for adjusting supply and demand in response to changing
market conditions. Pipeline companies often face excess demand during extremely cold weather,
because gas prices do not reflect the short-termn  economic value of natural gas. Demand in peak
periods is often controlled through administrative rules rather than prices, resulting in inefficient
resource allocation.
Deregulation of the  gas industry and greater flexibility  in supply diminish the  importance of
long-term supply contracts and give rise to medium- and short-term contracts. In model 3 or 4
market participants need to balance their gas supply and demand in the short term. This need
leads to  the development  of  a  spot  market, where  producers,  traders,  suppliers,  distribution
utilities, and  large end  users trade natural gas on a  daily basis. Market participants enter into15
contracts of different duration, building a contract portfolio that minimizes supply and price risks
in both the long and the short run.
By  generating  price  signals  about  the  market  value  of  natural  gas,  spot  markets  promote
efficiency  in the natural  gas industry. A spot market usually develops in an area with a high
concentration  of  buyers  and  sellers,  such  as  at  a  pipeline  interconnection  near  a  large
metropolitan area or at a  terminal  in a gas-producing region. The aggregation of supply  and
demand increases the liquidity of the market and boosts competition among market participants.
If there is competition among market participants, short-term (spot) prices follow the short-run
marginal cost of natural gas. This means that the spot prices of natural gas reflect its economic
value at  a  particular time  and  location (at the spot market),  and  market  participants,  facing
efficient prices, can make optimal decisions about their trading strategies. But spot prices tend to
be  volatile  because they change  in  response to  changes in underlying  factors of  supply and
demand,  such  as  weather,  available  pipeline  capacity,  or  consumption  pattern.  Market
participants become exposed to this price risk because they are unable to predict the future price
of natural  gas. Their demand for tools to  minimize price risk leads to the development of a
financial gas market.
Financial gas market
The financial gas market is the marketplace where financial gas contracts are traded. A financial
gas contract is used primarily for managing price risk and is not necessarily for physical delivery.
Participants in the financial gas market come from all segments of the gas industry.  Because
transactions in this market involve the transfer of risks among these participants, intermediation
plays an important role. The main intermediaries are traders and financial institutions, such as
banks and organized exchanges.
Financial  gas contracts  are highly variable because of  the heterogeneity  of  needs  of  market
participants. The most common types of contract are forward contracts, swaps, futures contracts,
and options. 7
*  Afrrward  contract is a supply contract between a buyer and seller that obligates the buyer to
take delivery, and the seller to provide delivery, of a fixed amount of  a commodity at a
predetermined price at a specified date. Payment in full is due at the time  of or following
delivery.  (By contrast, for a  futures contract settlement  is made  daily, resulting in  partial
payment over the life of the contract.)
a  A swap is custom-tailored, individually negotiated transaction designed to manage financial
risk,  usually  over  a  period  of  1 to  12 years.  Swaps  can  be  conducted  directly by  two
counterparties or through a third party such as a bank or brokerage house. The writer of the
The definitions  of financial  gas contracts  draw on the U.S.  experience.  They are from U.S. Department  of Energy
1995  and NYMEX  119961.16
swap, such as a bank or brokerage house, may elect to assume the risk itself or manage its
own market exposure on an exchange. Parties exchange payments based on changes in the
price of natural gas, while fixing the price they effectively pay for physical delivery. The
transaction enables each party to manage exposure to natural gas spot prices. Settlement is
usually in cash.
*  A futures contract is a represents a legal agreement between a party that opens a position on
the futures market to buy or sell natural gas and the commodity exchange. The party agrees
to  accept or deliver, during  a specified  month, a certain quantity  of natural  gas meeting
quality and delivery conditions described by the exchange. If delivery takes place, it occurs
during  the  delivery month  at a  prescribed  settlement  price.  Futures contracts  are  traded
exclusively on regulated exchanges and are settled daily based on their current market value.
*  An options contract gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to purchase or sell the
underlying futures contract at a specified price within a specified period in exchange for a
one-time  premium  payment.  The  contract  also  obligates  the  writer,  who  receives  the
premium, to meet these obligations.
A financial  gas market tends to develop once the physical gas market  has reached  a  certain
maturity and most natural gas is traded under short-term contracts. Since few countries have a
liquid and  mature spot market, the financial gas market  is relatively new to the gas industry.
Only the United States has a well-developed one.
Swaps and forwards are usually among the first financial gas contracts developed. They tend to
be customer-specific  contracts, developed  by  financial  intermediaries and  traders  to  suit  the
needs  of  individual clients-producers,  distribution  utilities, and  large  end  users  seeking  to
minimize the price risk they face in the physical gas market.
Demand for financial gas contracts increases as the physical gas market matures. The
concentration of gas trading in spot markets facilitates the development of standardized financial
gas contracts, such as futures and options contracts, that are developed and supplied by organized
exchanges. For example, the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the Kansas City
Board of Trade (KCBOT) in the United States have introduced standardized natural gas futures
and options contracts for delivery in four major spot markets in the United States and Canada
(see Juris forthcoming b).
Financial gas contracts serve two main purposes. They minimize the price risk in the natural gas
spot  market,  and  they minimize  the basis  risk  resulting  from  the imperfect  match  between
physical and financial gas contracts. They also serve as an instrument for speculation and price
arbitrage in the gas market.
Minimizing price risk  Market participants minimize the price risk in the natural gas spot market
by taking  positions in  the financial gas market,  sometimes referred  to as  hedging.  Financial
contracts  enable market participants to take  positions  in cash (or physical)  and  financial  gas17
markets to reach an acceptable level of risk. Different levels of risk aversion and the complexity
of  the  gas  market  create  room  for  market  participants  to  engage  in  mutually  beneficial
transactions.
Transactions in the financial gas market involve the transfer of price risk between two market
participants in exchange for payment. A market participant with high risk aversion is willing to
pay a higher premium to get rid of a certain amount of price risk than a participant with low risk
aversion. If the participant with low risk aversion can hedge against the price risk, it can acquire
the price risk from the participant with high risk aversion. The two participants can then split the
difference  in  premium.  and  both  will  be  better  off  than  if  they  minimized  the  price  risk
separately.
In practice, price risk cannot be diversified away completely because of systemic risk, the risk
that is inherent to the market and cannot be diversified away. Market participants can diversify
away  only  nonsystemic  risk, that is,  contract- or  customer-specific  risk. But  this  requires  a
sophisticated  understanding  of  hedging  strategies  and  the  functioning  of  markets.  The
nonsystemic risk of a contract can be diversified away through a portfolio of cash and financial
gas contracts that best approximates the market (that is. one that has coefficient beta equal to  1).
Gas traders and other intermediaries are much better able to diversify away nonsystemic risk than
other  market  participants.  They  take  nonsystemic  price  risks  from  producers,  distribution
utilities, and other market participants in exchange for premiums and then diversify these risks
away  by  taking  positions  in  physical and  financial  gas  markets. The  cost  of  hedging  their
positions is lower because they are less risk averse and more sophisticated in hedging strategies
than other market participants. Competition among traders pushes premiums down to the least
cost  of  price risk hedging  and thus benefits all  market  participants engaged  in  financial  gas
transactions.
Minimizing  basis risk. The use of financial gas contracts that differ in one or several dimensions
from the underlying physical gas contract may result in a difference in the qualitative
characteristics of contracted and delivered natural gas. This risk is the basis risk, the uncertainty
about whether the cash-futures differential will widen or narrow between the time a hedge
position is implemented and the time it is liquidated (NYMEX [1996]). The basis risk depends
on three price relationships:
*  The relationship between the price of the futures contract and the spot price of gas. This
represents cash-futures basis.
*  The relationship between the spot price at the futures contract delivery point and the spot
price of a similar but not identical commodity at the same location. This is intercommodity
basis.
*  The relationship between the spot price at the futures delivery point and the spot price at a
different location. This represents locational basis.18
Strategies to minimize basis risk differ depending on the type of basis risk involved. Cash-futures
basis risk can be minimized by a financial gas contract -that specifically addresses the problems.
For  example,  participants  in  the  U.S.  financial  gas  market  use  the  Alternative  Delivery
Procedures, which allow them to minimize cash-futures price differentials in the period between
the expiration date of a futures contract and the start of physical gas delivery. This period ranges
from one to five days, depending on the type of futures contract.
Hedging  intercommodity  basis  risk  is  a  complex  operation  that  varies  from  case  to  case,
depending on the kind of commodities involved. If the commodities are commercially traded,
market participants can minimize basis risk by taking positions  in cash and financial markets in
the relevant commodities. If qualitative differences in a commodity are very small and are not
commonly  traded  in the market,  such as the difference in the  calorific value  of natural  gas,
hedging tools may not be available. In such a case parties must protect themselves by explicitly
defining delivery conditions and providing for penalties in the gas supply contracts.
Locational basis risk  can be managed by a financial gas contract created specifically  for this
purpose. For example, participants in the U.S. gas industry  can use Exchange  of Futures  for
Physicals contracts (EFPs), which allow them to hedge the locational basis risk for almost any
delivery location in the United States. Naturally, the efficiency of hedging by EFPs depends on
the liquidity of EFPs with the same delivery locations, which in turn depends on the size and
liquidity of the spot  gas market at  a particular location. As  a  result,  EFPs provide effective
hedging of locational basis risk only at the most commonly used locations, such as large market
centers.
Transportation market
A transportation market is a market where transportation services-pipeline  capacity and natural
gas  shipments  for  delivery  of  natural  gas  to  a  desired  location-are  sold  in  the  form  of
transportation contracts. The contracts are sold by pipeline companies to shippers. Transportation
contracts are either firm or interruptible, depending on the reliability of the services they offer.
Holders of firm transportation contracts may  resell them in the secondary transportation market
if regulation permits such transactions.
The transportation market  emerges only  in the model  3 natural  gas industry,  where pipeline
companies offer open access to their pipeline grids. The market develops further with unbundling
and the introduction of retail competition. Model 4 has a fairly developed transportation market,
where industry participants trade transportation contracts for gas shipments in all pipeline grids.
Primary transportation market
The primary transportation market facilitates the initial distribution of transportation contracts.
The contracts  give  the shippers that  buy them the right to  transportation services under  the
conditions specified. The most common conditions relate to the size of reserved capacity, the size
of natural gas shipment, the location of points of injection and withdrawal, pipeline pressure, the
time and duration of service, service reliability, and charges for capacity and throughput.19
Characteristics of service determine the structure of the contracts, with the most important being
duration and reliability. Duration-based transportation contracts are divided into long-, medium-,
and short-term contracts, linking them to  the duration of  gas supply contracts and facilitating
simultaneous clearing of natural  gas and  transportation markets in an  unbundled natural gas
industry.
Reliability-based transportation contracts  can be  divided into two major categories:  firm and
interruptible.  A  firm  transportation  contract  gives  its  holder  the  right  to  capacity  and
transportation  over the  whole  life  of the  contract, regardless of the  season.  It specifies  the
maximum daily quantity of gas that can be transported through the pipeline, points of injection
and withdrawal. and charges for reserved capacity and transportation service. The holder of the
contract can ask for shipment of  natural gas up to the maximum reserved capacity (capacity
utilization is measured by the load factor, calculated as the ratio of average daily capacity usage
to the maximum daily reserved capacity). This request is usually made through notification of the
pipeline  company  about  the  volume  of  natural  gas  to  be  shipped  on  the  next  day,  or
''nomination.'
An interruptible transportation contract gives its holder the right to ship a specified volume of
natural gas within a certain period, for example, within a particular month. But the timing  of
transportation is determined by the pipeline company according to the availability of capacity.
There  are also  hybrids of  firm and  interruptible contracts,  such as  no-notice  or limited firm
transportation contracts. A no-notice firm transportation contract gives its holder the right to the
maximum daily reserved capacity, but  the holder does  not have to  maintain a  daily balance
between nominated and delivered natural gas. A limited firm transportation contract offers firm
transportation service, but the service is subject to interruption for a  specified amount of time
each month, say, up to 10 days.
The primary transportation market is regulated because of the natural monopoly characteristics of
pipeline  transportation  (see  the  section  above  on  the  determinants  of  industry  structure).
Governments often regulate prices, investment, contracts and delivery  conditions,  and market
access.
The nature of contracting for transportation services varies with industry structure and regulation.
Vertically  integrated  natural  gas  companies  typically  offer  long-term  firm  transportation
contracts that specify the total volume of gas to be delivered to  the users over the life of the
contract.  Users then  specify monthly  or  quarterly  deliveries that  must  add  up  to  this  total
contracted volume by the end of the contract. Long-term contracts give pipeline companies and
shippers certainty in demand and supply, and they give pipeline companies the ability to recover
their fixed costs through revenues from contracted capacity.
Deregulation of natural gas markets creates a need for flexible transportation services. Market
participants need to balance supply and  emand  in the short term,  which is possible only if a
natural gas  supply contract is matched by a  transportation contract in  all  major dimensions.20
Pipeline  companies  respond to  this  need by  offering medium-  and  short-term  transportation
contracts  and flexibility in the choice of injection and delivery points. This  response must  be
facilitated  by a regulatory change introducing a more flexible regulatory environment for the
pipeline companies and creating a  secondary transportation market. For example, in  1992 the
U.S.  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission required all pipeline companies to  provide more
delivery  and  injection  points  in  their  pipeline  systems  and offer  their  customers  no-notice,
balancing, and storage services.  It also changed the formula for calculating transportation rates
and  introduced  the  capacity  release  program,  a  secondary market  with  firm  transportation
contracts.
Secondairy  transportation market
Holders of unused transportation contracts resell them in the secondary transportation market.
Buyers and sellers in this market come from all segments of the gas industry, although pipeline
companies are typically excluded because of market power concerns.
The resale of transportation contracts promotes the efficiency of the transportation market and
facilitates simultaneous clearing of natural gas and  transportation markets. The need to  resell
contracts  arises as a  result of short-term changes in supply and  demand for individual users
which often lead to a situation in which some users do not utilize all their contracted pipeline
capacity while others lack sufficient capacity to meet their needs. In the absence of a secondary
market,  the  unused  capacity  lies  idle,  with  the  result  that  resources  are  wasted  and  trade
opportunities  lost. In addition, potential  buyers lose the  benefits of  having more natural  gas
available  at their  desired  location. Allowing  the  resale  of transportation  contracts  therefore
benefits the entire natural gas industry.
If transportation contracts establish property rights and are transferable, holders can trade them
freely (tlhough  notification of the pipeline company about the change of contract ownership may
be required) and the secondary market flourishes. Firm capacity contracts that give their holders
the riglit to  reserved capacity may be transferable, for example, depending on  the prevailing
regulation.
If transportation contracts establish property rights but are not transferable, holders can engage in
a  side  deal,  delivering  natural  gas  for  a  third  party. The  owner  of  the  natural  gas  pays  a
transportation fee to the contract holder, who in turn pays the pipeline company the rate specified
in the contract. The secondary market exists, but the complicated trading procedures harm market
efficiency  because  high  transaction  costs  discourage  some  users  from  trading  their  unused
capacity.
If transportation  contracts  do  not  establish  property  rights,  they  cannot  be  traded,  and  the
secondary market does not exist, at least officially (but shippers can still engage in side deals to
match  their  natural  gas  and  transportation  contracts,  as  in  the  case  of  nontransferable
transportation  contracts).  This  is  the worst  possible  case because  the  potential  benefits  of
capacity resale are not realized.21
Regulation of the secondary transportation market is unnecessary if there is competition among
buyers and sellers of transportation contracts. The price of a firm transportation contract resold in
a competitive secondary market should reflect the short-run marginal costs of  pipeline operation
and the opportunity costs of capacity. This pricing mechanism allows the prices of capacity and
shipping  services to  adjust to  changes in  short-term supply and  demand. Thus.  for example,
prices for pipeline capacity would be high during peak periods, when demand exceeds supply,
but approach zero during periods of excess supply. By contrast, the price for shipping natural gas
would  be  relatively  low  and  constant  because  of  the  relatively  low  and  constant  marginal
operating costs.
Secondary  trading  of  transportation  contracts  can  take  several  forms.  A  typical  trading
arrangement  is an auction where  interested shippers bid  by price for available  transportation
contracts.  Auctions  are  used  for trading  both  long-  and  short-termn  transportation  contracts,
though rigorous auction procedures sometimes discourage resale of short-term contracts because
of the time requirements.
Another common form of trading is bilateral dealing. This form of trading facilitates the resale of
all types of transportation contracts because it gives shippers much flexibility in negotiating the
conditions of transactions.
Trading  may  also  take  place  in  a  spot  market,  where  shippers  actively  trade  short-term
transportation  contracts.  Spot  market  trading  requires  standardizing  transportation  contracts
across all  important dimensions in order to promote efficient pricing of the contracts.  It also
requires other  characteristics of a  liquid spot market,  such as a  large number  of buyers  and
sellers, large available capacity, and the concentration of trading in one or several locations. An
active  spot  market  for  transportation contracts  provides  scope  for  a  financial  transportation
market, where market participants can minimize the price and basis risks in the transportation
market.
Markets in other segments of the gas industry
Increasing deregulation and restructuring of the natural gas industry leads to the emergence of
markets in other segments of the industry. Unbundling and open access, for example, give rise to
markets in natural gas storage, metering and installation of meters, construction of pipelines, and
pipeline system balancing.
Storage
Unbundling  pipelines  gives  natural gas storage a  new role  in natural  gas  and  transportation
markets  in addition to its traditional role of load balancing. 8 As a natural gas industry  moves
toward structural model 4, storage is deregulated and storage operators become active in the gas
' Load  balancing  preserves  the  balance  between  injections  and  withdrawals  of natural  gas  in the  pipeline  system.22
market, buying and selling natural gas as market conditions change. Storage can be crucial in
relieving pipeline congestion in local gas markets and helping to lower gas prices.
Deregulation of gas prices and the gas market creates plenty of profit opportunities for storage
facilities. Profit-maximizing storage operators look for markets where prices are high because of
a  lack of  competition  or frequent congestion  of the  pipeline  system. A  storage  facility  can
increase competition in a local market because it becomes another player in the market, giving
other market participants another choice in selecting a supplier or buyer. And the success of one
storage facility can attract more operators, further increasing competition.
Deregulating storage operations can help relieve pipeline congestion. In a local gas market high
seasonal variation in natural gas prices may reflect pipeline capacity constraints in peak periods.
A storage operator can use the available pipeline capacity in off-peak periods, when natural gas
prices are low, to inject natural gas into storage, and then sell this gas in the local market  for
higher prices during peak periods. The storage operator reaps the benefits of high peak prices, but
it also pushes peak prices toward competitive levels because the availability of natural gas from
storage relieves congestion, at least partially. And its high profits will attract additional storage
facilities to the market, which will further lower prices.
But storage operators face two major problems in deregulated gas markets. The first is linked to
volatile gas prices, which introduce much uncertainty into decisions about the size and location
of  a  storage  facility.  Since most  storage profits  come  from  location-  and  time-based  price
arbitrage, being able to predict  future prices is crucial. Storage operators benefit greatly from
price discovery in the financial gas market, which provides efficient signals about future natural
gas prices. If the  financial  gas market  is not  developed,  storage operators can reduce  price
uncertainty by signing a long-term supply or purchase contract.
The second problem is linked to regulation of storage. Despite its increasing commercialization,
storage still serves as a tool to balance load in the pipeline network. If a storage facility serves
both functions, it  becomes subject to  regulation because of its  link to the regulated pipeline
transportation segment. But  distinguishing the costs  associated  with load  balancing from  the
costs associated with regular commercial operation is difficult, so determining the charges for
load balancing  is  a  complicated and  imprecise exercise.  The remedy  is to  create a  balance
market, where a pipeline company trades system imbalances with other participants in the gas
market (see the section below on the balance market).
Metering and installation of meters
A market in metering emerges as a result of the introduction of retail competition in model 4.
Metering becomes an important element in retail competition because suppliers must know how
much  natural  gas  each  consumer  uses.  Initially,  all  metering  facilities  are  controlled  by  a
distribution company. But independent suppliers, fearing that the distribution utility will exercise
market power and provide low-quality metering  services, will demand independent metering
services. An opportunity is thus created for new entrants to install new meters or take over old
ones, and to sell metering services to independent suppliers, distribution utilities, and end users.23
Independent metering is limited by the costs of metering and installation, however. Suppliers and
end users will probably find that the costs of metering at residential sites outweigh the potential
savings because of the prohibitive costs of new metering devices and the low potential benefits.
Independent metering has developed mainly for large and medium-size consumer sites, while
small sites are still served predominantly by distribution utilities. Only the introduction of low-
cost metering technology can promote increasing use of independent metering and eliminate the
ability of distribution companies to restrict retail competition through inferior metering.
Construiclion  of pipelines
A market in construction of new pipelines emerges when deregulation of pipeline transportation
allows construction and operation  of natural gas pipelines by third-parties.  This decentralized
pipeline expansion regime can be introduced in structural models 3 and 4. (A centralized regime
allows pipeline construction only by pipeline companies.)
New pipeline capacity is added when market participants find it more beneficial to construct new
capacity than to pay a congestion rent. Under a decentralized regime a pipeline company operates
as a contract carrier and does not have an obligation to construct new capacity. If demand grows
beyond available capacity in a location, market participants will face high spot prices for natural
gas  in that  location because  of the  resulting congestion. Once the expected  present value of
congestion payments (congestion rent paid to a pipeline company or congestion premiums paid
to gas traders) exceeds the present value of the costs of constructing  and operating a pipeline,
market participants will add to pipeline capacity.
Three important factors affect the efficiency of the decentralized capacity  expansion regime.
First, locational spot markets must be liquid and deregulated to generate efficient signals about
the market value of natural gas. An efficient spot market enables market participants to estimate
the congestion rent in a particular location by comparing spot market prices among locations.
Second, charges for transporting natural gas between locations should not distort locational spot
pricing of natural gas. Regulation of transportation rates must ensure that all participants in the
gas market face the same rates for transportation if they demand qualitatively and quantitatively
identical services. In addition, regulators should promote trading in the secondary transportation
market because it facilitates efficient pricing of pipeline capacity and reveals information about
the size of the congestion rent.
Third, cooperation between new and  incumbent pipeline  companies is  important to  promote
functional integration of their pipelines. If two pipelines fail to coordinate their transportation
services, transactions between participants connected to the different pipeline systems will be
difficult. So, to ensure efficiency, the incumbent pipeline company and an independent pipeline
operator  should  agree  on  a  mechanism  to  facilitate  transactions  through  their  pipeline
interconnection.24
To increase  revenues  and reduce  average  costs, an independent  pipeline  operator should consider
providing open access to  its pipeline to  parties that did  not participate in  the  pipeline's
construction.  Benefits  from operating  a pipeline  can be distributed  among  its owners  on the basis
of their contributions  to the construction  costs. If the new pipeline  experiences  congestion in the
future, the pipeline  owners  can more than  recover  their investment  through  congestion  rents. 9
Balance market
A balance  market  is a market  where  pipeline  system imbalances  are traded  through  an auction.  A
system imbalance  arises when there is a difference  between the volume of gas flows and the
available capacity  in the pipeline  system.  A system imbalance  can occur any time that shippers
do not maintain  their individual  balances-the  balances  between  their nominated and actual gas
shipments. The balance market can first appear in model 3 or 4,  but so  far its practical
implementation  has been limited  to the United  Kingdom. A balance  market was created  there in
1996,  when British  Gas was unbundled  into a gas supplier  and a pipeline  system  operator.
The balance  market is closely linked  to the operation  of the pipeline  system.  A pipeline  operator
must maintain a balance between injected and withdrawn  natural gas to ensure the safety and
reliability  of transportation  services.  The operator  achieves  a balance  by scheduling  gas flows for
the following  day on the basis of shippers' nominations,  the information  shippers provide  about
desired directions and volumes of  shipments. The operator then runs the  pipeline system
according  to the schedule  and monitors  injections and withdrawals in real time.
But before the gas day, the pipeline operator  invites shippers  to bid for system imbalances.  The
imbalances  can be positive  or negative, depending  on whether there is an excess or shortage  of
natural gas in the system.  Shippers  send bids stating  how much  gas they are willing to buy or sell
if a system imbalance  occurs, and at what price. If the system runs into an imbalance,  the
operator  determines  how much  natural gas it must buy or sell to restore  balance and then accepts
the bids that do so at the lowest  total cost. The operator  pays the winning  bidders  a price equal to
the price of the last bid accepted.  If the bidding  for system imbalances  is competitive,  this price
reflects  the system's short-run  marginal  cost of gas.
An efficient  balance  market  produces  information  with wide utilization  in the deregulated  gas
industry.  The prices generated  by the balance  market  can be used  for pricing  the load  balancing
services  provided  by storage  facilities  to pipeline  companies.  The price of a system imbalance
reflects  the costs that the imbalances  of individual  shippers  imposed  on the pipeline  system,  so
the pipeline  operator  knows  exactly  how  much it must recover  from undisciplined  shippers.
Finally,  the cost of restoring  system balance  signals  the pipeline  operator  when to use the balance
market  and when  to curtail gas flows.
9  Whether  pipeline sources can recover their investment  congestion  rents depends on the type of regulation  of
transportation  charges.  A pipeline  operator  can earn congestion  rents only if it can charge  prices based on the short-
run marginal  cost of transportation.  See Harvey,  Hogan,  and Pope, 1996.25
Trading Models in the Deregulated Natural Gas Industry
Trading mechanisms guide transactions in natural gas and transportation markets. They facilitate
interactions among market participants with the objective of achieving simultaneous clearing of
natural gas and transportation markets at minimum cost to the gas industry.
Deregulation of the natural gas industry leads to separate trading of natural gas and transportation
services, which increases the complexity of markets and  imposes substantial requirements on
market participants if they are to complete all their transactions at the minimum cost.  While a
vertically  integrated  gas  company  optimizes  all  transactions  internally,  participants  in  a
deregulated gas industry must coordinate their natural gas and transportation transactions in an
open market. The process of minimizing the total cost of natural gas and transportation to the
industry must take place across thousands of decentralized transactions. Unless these transactions
are guided by a trading model. they can result in suboptimal allocation of resources.
Two distinct trading models have been developed: a bilateral trading model and a poolco model.
Both models achieve market clearing at the minimum cost, though in different ways. The main
differences between the models are in the nature of transactions and in the way the transactions
are coordinated in natural gas and transportation markets.'°
Bilateral trading model
The bilateral trading model is based on decentralized bilateral transactions. The model relies on
competitive gas and transportation markets to generate efficient prices and minimize the cost of
natural gas to the end users.
Decentralized spot markets
In the bilateral trading model market participants conclude all deals in bilateral negotiations and
write contracts that address all issues relevant to a transaction. Demand for ways to minimize of
transaction costs leads to the emergence of traders who  complete transactions on behalf of other
market  participants. Spot  markets develop  as  market participants  require efficient  pricing  of
natural gas at every moment. Spot markets are thus developed through the decentralized action of
market forces.
Competitive spot markets  generate signals about the market value of natural gas and give market
participants the right incentives to complete transactions  efficiently. As a result. decentralized
bilateral trading among market participants achieves the outcome that is optimal for individual
participants as well as for the natural gas industry as a whole.
Distance-based pricing of transportation
'  The following  sections  draw  heavily  on the excellent  discussion  of trading  models  in Hunt  and Shuttleworth  1996.26
Charges for transportation services sold in the primary transportation market are based on the
fixed and  variable costs  of  a  pipeline company  per  unit  of  distance  over  which  individual
shipments take place. A capacity charge is set to recover total fixed costs, while a throughput
charge is used to recover the variable costs of transporting natural gas. Transportation contracts
sold in the secondary market are priced according to the short-run marginal cost of capacity.
A  competitive  secondary  capacity  market  and  the availability  of  many  different  firm  and
interruptible transportation contracts enable shippers to match their needs for natural gas with
transportation services. They form a portfolio of transportation contracts that gives  them  the
minimum acceptable reliability of transportation at the minimum cost. Because each shipper is
able to minimize its total cost of natural gas and transportation, the total cost of natural gas to end
users is minimized.
Direct access in retail competition
In the bilateral trading model retail competition takes place among suppliers who compete by
price for power supply contracts. End users can choose a supplier of natural gas, which is then
responsible for arranging transportation of natural gas to the consumption site. This structure, in
which end users enter into supply contracts with suppliers, is referred to as "direct access."
Suppliers charge end users a single price for a unit of delivered natural gas. Competition among
suppliers ensures that the retail price is equal to the sum of the wholesale gas price plus the
distribution  fee.  Since  suppliers  have the  ability to  acquire  natural  gas  and  transportation
services at the minimum  cost, end users face optimal retail prices. So all transactions  in the
natural gas industry lead to the socially optimal outcome.
Poolco model
In the  poolco model  transactions  are coordinated by  a  single  entity,  which  ensures  that  all
transactions in natural  gas and transportation markets are completed at the minimum cost  to
society. The poolco model is based on the notion that decentralized bilateral transactions do not
always  lead  to  the  socially  optimal  outcome  in  the  gas  industry  because  of  the  technical
characteristics of natural gas pipeline systems."
Pool operator
Transactions in the natural gas market are facilitated by a pool  operator, an entity  assigned a
market clearing responsibility by the regulator. Market participants inform the pool operator how
much natural gas they want to purchase or sell and at what prices they are willing to complete
" This  argument  is taken  from the context  of the electric  power  industry.  Like an electric  power  transmission  grid, a
natural  gas pipeline  system  exhibits  network  externalities  that  affect loads in two  separate  locations.  A gas shipment
from one location  can reduce  the capacity  available  to shippers  in an adjacent  interconnected  pipeline.  However,  the
operator  of a pipeline  network  has more  options  for controlling  loads  and flows in real  time than  the operator  of a
power  transmission  grid.27
transactions. The pool operator aggregates this information into system supply and demand and
calculates the svstem price that will clear the market. This procedure is repeated at short intervals
to generate continuous pricing of natural gas.
The pool operator can divide the natural gas market into several local markets (nodes) if there is
insufficient pipeline capacity to move natural gas between locations.  It would then determine
prices for each node using the same procedure.
The  system  price reflects  the  market  value  of  natural  gas.  Competition  among natural  gas
suppliers and buyers ensures that system prices reflect the short-run marginal costs of natural
gas-tlhat  is, that they are efficient. Because all market  participants complete  transactions at
system prices or their derivatives the outcome of trading under the poolco model is socially
optimal.
Locationcal  pricing oj/trcansportation
Transportation is sold as a service that takes natural gas in or releases it from the pipeline system
at a particular location. Shippers buy entry and exit capacity at points of injection and withdrawal
from a pipeline company or other shippers. They order transportation services by nominating the
volume of natural gas they want to ship through the pipeline system on the next day. A pipeline
company reviews the nominations of all shippers and determines the schedule of gas flows that
minimizes the total cost of transportation. If some capacity remains after the nominations of firm
shippers have been accounted for, the pipeline company offers interruptible services to  other
shippers. Gas flows in the pipeline system do not always follow the "contractual paths" because a
pipeline company can often find a more optimal way to direct flows through the system.
The prices of transportation services are based on the market value of capacity and throughput at
the entry or exit point and thus reflect the short-run marginal cost of capacity and throughput.
Prices vary in time and across locations, reflecting differences in the market value of capacity
(the  marginal  cost  of  throughput  tends  to  be  small  and  constant).  A  pipeline  company
determines the value of capacity as the difference between nodal prices of natural gas, because
this difference reflects the congestion rent earned by a congested pipeline. Competitive local gas
spot  markets generate  efficient  signals  about  the size  of  the congestion  rent,  ensuring  that
shippers pay efficient prices for transportation services and can make optimal  transactions in
natural gas and transportation markets.2
Virtual ciccess  in retail competition
Under the poolco model retail competition takes place among suppliers who compete by price for
financial  gas  contracts.  End  users  receive physical  delivery  of  natural  gas  from  the  local
distribution utility, which charges only for transporting the gas through distribution pipelines and
12 But  shippers  face  price  risk in  the  transportation  market  if capacity  prices  are  based  on the  short-run  marginal
costs.  To enable  shippers  to minimize  price  risk,  a financial  transportation  market  must  be created  .28
fully passes through the prevailing nodal price of gas to the end users. As a result, end users face
spot prices,  but  they cannot  choose  another  gas supplier, a  structure  referred  to  as  "virtual
access." 
End users are exposed to price risk because they face volatile spot prices. Suppliers therefore sell
them  insurance plans-financial  gas contracts that stabilize retail prices by minimizing  price
risk-and  end  users choose among suppliers  based on the insurance premiums.  Competition
among suppliers ensures that premiums are efficient, reflecting the risk aversion of end users and
the costs  of  hedging. Because  end  users face  both  efficient spot  prices for  natural  gas  and
efficient  insurance premiums, the outcome  of all  transactions  in the  natural  gas  industry  is
socially optimal.
The bilateral versus the poolco model in the natural gas industry
If properly applied,  the bilateral and  poolco trading models both  lead to  the  same outcome.
Which nmodel  is more appropriate for a country depends on the characteristics on its natural gas
industry. Countries with relatively  large gas markets can rely on the decentralized actions of
market forces to  develop a liquid and competitive spot market and could therefore  opt for the
bilateral model. Smaller countries may find it necessary to speed up the development of a spot
market  by  establishing  a  pool  operator  that  facilitates  market  clearing  in  the  gas  and
transportation markets.
The structure of a pipeline system also affects the choice of trading model. Pipelines with a trunk
line  structure  are  ideal  for  the bilateral  model  because network  extemalities  are  small.  By
contrast, a pipeline system structured as a dense network exhibits network externalities because
loads in one line affect loads in another one. And since bilateral transactions  do not take into
account load interdependencies, market participants can require transportation services that do
not minimize total transportation costs. In this case, then, the poolco model is more appropriate,
because it allows the pipeline operator to determine the optimal gas flow schedule regardless of
contractual paths.
Transactions in the bilateral trading model are relatively simple. Because they are bilateral, they
are easy to complete and understand even in complex markets. By contrasts, transactions in the
poolco model place enormous information requirements on the pool operator, which must have
access to information about the availability, prices, and costs of natural gas and transportation.
As a result of these information requirements, the prime candidate for the job of pool operator is
a  pipeline company,  which has the  best  information about the pipeline system-information
difficult to obtain in a decentralized market. An altemative candidate is an  independent entity
jointly  owned by all  participants in the gas industry. In such a case, the pool  operator must
establish confidentiality rules to ensure all participants that sensitive information will be well
protected.
Application of these two tradiig  models in the natural gas industry has been uneven. Almost all
countries have opted for the bilateral trading model, because it is simpler to implement than the
poolco  model.  In  these  countries,  natural  gas  trading  takes  place  primarily  as  a  bilateral29
transaction in decentralized spot markets and retail competition, if introduced at all. is based on
the direct access scheme, in which end users conclude physical gas contracts with suppliers. The
poolco model has been applied only in the United Kingdom, and there only to a limited extent.
A typical example of the bilateral trading model exists in the gas industry in the United States,
where natural gas spot markets have developed as a result of deregulation during the past six
years. Resale of transportation contracts has led to the development of a secondary transportation
market and promoted variability in transportation contracts. Trading takes place on a bilateral
basis in a competitive market. Transaction costs are minimized through the use of natural gas
marketing  companies  and  electronic  trading  systems  that  aggregate  information  about  the
availability  and  prices  of  natural  gas  and  transportation  across  regions.  Competition  and
transparency in the gas and secondary transportation markets promote efficient pricing of natural
gas and transportation contracts. And because market participants can coordinate transactions in
both natural gas and transportation markets, they can minimize their total cost of natural gas and
transportation.
In the limited version  of the poolco model in the U.K.  gas industry, British Gas TransCo,  a
pipeline system operator, optimizes gas transportation regardless of the contractual paths. It has
organized a spot market for natural gas, called the "on-system" market, and a spot market for
system balanices,  the "flexibility" market. All other transactions in the gas industry are completed
on a bilateral basis.
British  Gas TransCo  optimizes gas  flows  through  the  pipeline system  on  the  basis  of  the
principle of minimizing total transportation costs. Shippers purchase entry and exit point capacity
and notify the operator about the volumes and locations of injection and withdrawal. The optimal
transportation schedule determines gas flows regardless of the transactions by shippers in  the
natural gas market.
On-system trading takes place among shippers when they exchange ownership of natural gas that
has been  inijected into the pipeline system. The pipeline system operator plays  the role of a
"natural gas exchange" to facilitate natural gas transactions, but it does not determine the system
price of  natural  gas.  Instead, prices are set  by  market  participants  in  decentralized bilateral
negotiations. On-system trading therefore combines the bilateral and poolco trading models.
In the balance, or flexibility, market, which is representative of poolco-style gas trading, the
operator receives bids for sale or purchase of natural gas from other market participants. If the
pipeline system experiences an imbalance, the operator accepts the bids that minimize the cost of
restoring system balance. Shippers whose bids are accepted are paid the system price that is
equal to the price of the last bid accepted (see Juris forthcoming a).30
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